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If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a preceding 
cause? The standard answer is: yes, it is caused by a divine willing. I 
propose an alternative view, based on a certain non-compatibilist solu-
tion of the dilemma of free will: God’s actions, unlike human actions, are 
not initiated by willings, undertakings, or tryings, but God brings about 
the intended event directly. I explain what ‘bringing about directly’ 
means. 
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1. The divine willing view 
Assume that the universe had a beginning, and the beginning was caused 
by God. Was there then an event that caused the beginning of the uni-
verse? More generally, if God causes an event E beginning at t, is there 
then an event C beginning before t which causes E? The usual answer is 
yes, I shall argue that the true answer is no. God can bring about events in 
the universe so that they have no preceding cause.  
The usual conception we find, for example, in Hofmann & Rosenkrantz’s 
book Divine Attributes:  
Necessarily, if an agent, A, intentionally [...] brings about an event [...], then A 
performs such an action either by deciding (or choosing) to do so or by endeavor-
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ing (or willing) to do so. Thus, if God exists, then he performs actions [...] via his 
decisions or endeavorings. (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2002, 103) 
The authors proceed to argue that to endeavour something is to engage in 
a ‘volitional activity’, and ‘a volitional activity of God would be an intrinsic 
change in him’ (103f). As only things in time can change, God is therefore 
in time. Similarly, Richard Swinburne argues that God is in time because, 
as causes are earlier than their effects, God’s ‘acting must be prior to the 
effects that his action causes’ (Swinburne 1993, 216). Also Quentin Smith 
assumes that there would be divine willings if there were a God, when he 
investigates ‘the relation between [God’s] act of willing (an event) and the 
beginning of the universe (another event)’ (Smith 1996, 170).  
These authors assume that every action, at least every free action, involves 
an action event in the agent’s mind which causes the intended event. De-
fenders of agent causation call it an ‘undertaking’ (Chisholm) or ‘trying’ 
(Swinburne), others call it a ‘volition’, ‘endeavouring’, or ‘willing’. From 
this assumption it follows that if God acts, then there are divine willings 
which cause the events God brings about. I call this the divine willing 
view. On this view, if the universe began with the Big Bang then there is a 
divine undertaking which began before the Big Bang and which caused the 
Big Bang.  
In this article I propose an alternative to this view. To explain and defend 
it I shall first offer a solution to the dilemma of free will. Then I shall expli-
cate some differences between human and divine action and defend the 
view that there are no divine willings and that the beginning of the uni-
verse had no preceding cause. More generally, my thesis is that God can 
bring about events in the universe so that they have no preceding cause. 
This thesis is independent of the assumption that the universe began with 
the Big Bang and that the universe had a beginning. I am presupposing 
that God is in time and that there was a time before the beginning of the 
universe. (For more on this, see Swinburne 1993, ch. 12.) On the view that 
God is outside time, it would be clear that an event brought about by God 
does not have a preceding cause. However, my thesis  
2. The dilemma of free will 
The dilemma is that the following two sentences seem to be true:  
A. If an action has a full cause, then it is not free. 
B. If an action does not have a full cause, then it happens by chance and is 
therefore not up to the agent and thus not free.  
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I shall present an incompatibilist account of free actions which rejects (B). 
(A) means that if an action was the result of a deterministic (or at least 
non-chancy) causal process, then it was not free. More precisely we should 
say that it was not free if it was determined before the beginning of the ac-
tion or if it was the result of a causal process into which the agent could not 
intervene. The action was not free then because the agent was forced to do 
it. (B) means that an event is either the result of a deterministic process or 
of an indeterministic, chancy process, and that an action which was the re-
sult of an indeterministic process was not free because the agent did not 
have control over the occurrence of the action and the action is not done 
for reasons. An action can only be free if it does not occur by chance, if it is 
up to the agent whether it occurs, and if the agent can do, or not do it, in 
the light of reasons. If both these thoughts, (A) and (B), were correct, then 
free actions would be impossible.  
Compatibilists reject (A). They hold that free will is compatible with the 
doctrine of determinism that every event has a deterministic preceding 
cause and so is the result of a deterministic causal process. One motivation 
for compatibilism is that we have bodies which are part of a physical uni-
verse and which are governed by laws of nature. The intended results of 
our actions are results of causal processes in our brain, nerves, and mus-
cles. Theses processes are governed by laws of nature. Many philosophers, 
because of their conception of laws of nature and of matter, therefore think 
that our actions too are the results of causal processes. As God does not 
have a body, this is not a reason for accepting a compatibilist account of 
divine action. If God’s actions are the results of processes in his mind, then 
these are immaterial processes, not governed by laws of nature.  
Another possible motivation for compatibilism is assumption (B) that if an 
actions is not the result of a deterministic process, then it is the result of an 
indeterministic process and hence occurs by chance and is not under the 
control of the agent. This is not the place to criticise the various compati-
bilist proposals. Let me just present an incompatibilist alternative which 
rejects (B) and in this respect makes the refuge to compatibilism unneces-
sary. As I have argued elsewhere (Wachter 2009, ch. 7.6) that free actions 
are compatible with determinism righly understood, I am reluctant to call 
my account ‘incompatibilist’, but it is informative to call it ‘incompatibilist’ 
because it contradicts determinism as usually understood as the doctrine 
that every event is the result of a deterministic causal process.  
The dilemma of free will arises through the assumption, which we can call 
mechanicism, that an event is either the result of a deterministic process or 
the result of an indeterministic, chancy process. We should reject this as-
sumption. We see why if we consider what a free action would be. A free 
action of a man, or any person with a body, involves a physical causal proc-
ess. The intended event is the result of a causal process in the brain, nerves 
and muscles. We can call this the action process. If the action process goes 
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back for ever, then the action is not free because it is not under the control 
of the agent and the agent is forced to do it (regardless of whether he feels 
forced or free). If the action process is at some stage indeterministic, that 
does not make the action free.  
So the action process must have a beginning, the ‘initial event’. A part of 
the initial event may be the result of a causal process, but a part must be 
not the result of a causal process, neither a deterministic nor a chancy one. 
We can call this event the ‘initiating event’. How did the initiating event 
occur? Some philosophers hold that it must be the result of a process 
which is indeterministic at some stage. Clarke (2000, 21) argues that it has 
to be caused indeterministically: ‘When a decision is freely made [...] there 
remained until the making of that decision a genuine chance that the agent 
would not make that decision.’ Others hold that in a free action the deci-
sion is caused deterministically but the process of deliberation leading to 
the decision is indeterministic. (Dennett 1978; Fischer and Ravizza 1992; 
Mele 1995.) It is true that if an action process were indeterministic, then it 
would be in some sense true, before the action occurred, that it was possi-
ble that another action would occur instead of the one that did occur. But 
this is not what we are getting at when we say that a free agent ‘could have 
done otherwise’. The trouble is that if it is a matter of indeterminacy which 
action occurs then it is not up to the agent what he does. An action that oc-
curs by chance is not a free action because the agent lacks control over 
which action occurs. If an action is the result of an indeterministic process, 
then the agent has as little control over it as an agent has over an action 
that occurs as the result of a deterministic process.  
Also defenders of ‘agent causation’, like Roderick Chisholm and Richard 
Swinburne, do not offer us a solution. They say that an action is free if it 
has ‘no sufficient causal condition’ (Chisholm 1976, 201) or if it is not 
‘causally necessitated’ (Swinburne 1997, 231) or ‘fully caused by earlier 
events’ (Swinburne 1994, 25). That leaves open that it is a chance event, 
over which the agent would have no control. We can dismiss all ap-
proaches which try to account for freedom by introducing chance.  
So how does the initiating event have to occur? If the action is free, then it 
is neither the result of a deterministic process, nor the result of an inde-
terministic process. Is there another way how an event can come about? 
Why not? The agent brought about the event directly. That means that it 
had no preceding cause but that its occurrence was due to the agent. The 
agent made it pop up. We can say that it was the agent’s decision or choice. 
It would be misleading to say that it was caused by the agent’s decision or 
choice, because that sounds as if the decision was a preceding event which 
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caused it. We can call an event which has no preceding cause but is due to 
an agent a choice event.1  
It does not matter whether you call the agent the ‘cause’ of the choice 
event. With a narrow concept of a cause, including just event causation, 
the agent is not to be called a cause and a choice event has no cause at all. 
With a wider concept of a cause, the agent is to be called the cause of a 
choice event. What matters only is that a choice event has no preceding 
cause, no event cause, and that its occurrence is due to the agent, it is his 
choice.  
Human actions involve mental events that are suitably called ‘willings’, 
‘tryings’, or ‘undertakings’. If I try to raise my arm but the arm does not 
move because it is paralyzed, then there is still the trying, which is a men-
tal event of a certain type. If I try to raise my arm successfully, then there is 
an event of the same type. It initiates the causal process leading to the ris-
ing of the arm. In human actions the choice events seem to be always un-
dertakings.  
Choice events will seem mysterious to many philosophers, because it has 
become such an unquestioned dogma that there is only one way how an 
event can come about, namely by being caused through a preceding event. 
But there is nothing incoherent or mysterious about choice events. The 
question is just whether there are choice events, but it is not our task here 
to examine the evidence for this. Choice events are only mysterious from 
the point of view that every event occurs through being caused by preced-
ing events. In itself they are no more mysterious than events that are 
caused by preceding events.  
3. God does not need undertakings 
Imagine someone locked into a room with a switchboard. Pressing buttons 
on the switchboard makes some machines, which the person can observe 
through a window, behave in certain ways. All which the person can do 
outside his room, he can do by pressing certain buttons on the 
switchboard, and he can do it only in this way. Pressing buttons starts cer-
tain causal processes which lead to certain behaviour of the machines. He 
does not know what these processes are, but he knows which buttons he 
has to press in order to achieve which results.  
                                                   
1  One can call the agent the cause of the choice event, but note that this account is very 
different from what Roderick Chisholm calls ‘agent causation’. See (Wachter 2003, 187-
189). 
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Similarly, we can act only in certain ways. When you try to raise your arm, 
then a certain action process is started automatically. We can change the 
material world only through our body, and we can move our body only 
through these mental events which we can call tryings or undertakings. 
The trying, which an identity theory would take to be identical with a brain 
event, causes certain events in your nerves and muscles. There is no way 
you can cut short this process, e.g. by directly making your muscles con-
tract, without there occurring the brain events which usually make your 
muscles contract when you raise your arm. We may have several possibili-
ties for moving a certain stone, e.g. by pushing it with our hand or by using 
a stick, but we (or most of us) cannot, for example, just focus on it and 
move it in the immediate way in which we can move our arms.  
God, being allmighty and having no body, is not constrained like this. 
There is no thing which he always has to use in order to bring something 
about. He does not have have to use anything in order to bring about a cer-
tain event. He can bring about every event which he can bring about di-
rectly. God can move a stone by moving another stone which pushes it. But 
He can also move the stone without using another material object. The 
movement of the stone then has no preceding physical cause. In the latter 
case he brings about the intended event more directly than in the former.  
The divine willing view assumes that the most direct way in which God can 
bring about an event in the universe, like the beginning of the universe or a 
miracle, is through an undertaking. But why should God, in order to create 
a universe, first bring about an event in His mind, an undertaking, which 
then causes the universe? For us men, all choice events are undertakings, 
which, if the action succeeds, initiate a causal process leading to the in-
tended event. But that is a limitation of power. God can can bring about 
the universe straight away, without delay, as a choice event. God can bring 
about any event as a choice event. That is what his omnipotence consists 
in. William Alston is pointing towards this when he writes: ‘If I am to 
knock over a vase or make a soufflé or communicate with someone, I must 
do so by moving my hands, legs, vocal organs, or whatever. But that is only 
because of my limitations. We can conceive of agents, corporeal or other-
wise, such that things other than their bodies (if any) are under their direct 
voluntary control.’ (Alston 1981, 61)2 To have a body – more precisely, to 
be able to act only through a body – is a limitation of one’s power. We can 
make a difference to the world around us only through the chunk of matter 
which is our body, and we can direct our body only through tryings. But 
God has unlimited power and thus no body; he can make a difference to 
                                                   
2  Alston means only that God can do anything as a ‘basic’ action, i.e. by doing it not by 
doing something else. That is not exactly the same as my claim that he can bring about 
any event (except the usual problem cases like John’ raising his arm freely) so that it has 
no preceding cause, because it could be that you bring about event X in a basic action but 
nevertheless X has a preceding cause.  
 7
the world other than through certain events in his mind and a particular 
chunk of matter. Whatever God chooses to happen happens without hav-
ing a preceding cause.  
The divine willing view rests on the thought: ‘An action is initiated by an 
undertaking (or “willing”), an undertaking is a mental event, therefore 
God’s actions in the world are initiated by undertakings, which are events 
in God’s mind.’ Of course, also if God acts, in some sense he ‘undertakes’ 
the action. In a sense, every event brought about by God directly is an un-
dertaking or a willing. But only if ‘undertaking’ is taken to mean choice 
event, and not if ‘undertaking’ is taken to mean, as I have defined it in ac-
cordance with what the defenders of the divine willing view mean, a men-
tal event of the kind which occurs in human actions. A free action is initi-
ated by a choice event, and that choice event may, but need not be, an un-
dertaking in the mind of the agent. Therefore the divine willing view is 
false.  
If God brought about the Big Bang, then the Big Bang might not have had a 
preceding cause. Why should it? God brought bring it about directly.  
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